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Definitions of discovery presume its time-and money-saving benefits,'
and presuppose a trial setting.2 Discovery, however, has not been tradi-
tionally considered applicable to arbitration. 3 More recently, though, legal
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1. The DICTIONARY OF ARBITRATION defines "discovery" as "a legal procedure invoked before
a trial to inform both parties of the facts in a dispute in order to narrow the issues and save time
and expense." DICTIONARY OF ARBITRATION AND ITS TERMS (K. Seide ed. 1970) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter cited as DICIONARY]. This may appear ironic to American practitioners because, in
practice, discovery procedures in United States courts have been deemed both time-consuming
and expensive. See generally Smith, The Concern over Discovery, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 51
(1978-79); Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 6 LITIGATION 5 (1980); Kohn,
Discovery Made Simpler (and Cheaper), 6 LITIGATION 3 (1980).
2. "Modern discovery practice, the process through which a litigant gains pre-trial informa-
tion upon the oath of his adversary. Goldstein, A Short History of Discovery, 10
ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 257 (1981).
3. The DICTIONARY OF ARBITRATION, supra note 1, at 73 states: "Discovery... as a procedure
has not been used often in arbitration, since arbitration is itself an informal and simplified
procedure... " See Willenken, Discovery in Aid of Arbitration, 6 LITIGATION 16 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Willenken, Discovery]: Willenken, The Often Overlooked Use of Discov-
ery in Aid of Arbitration and the Spread of the New York Rule to Federal Common Law, 35 Bus.
LAW. 173 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Willenken, The Often Overlooked].
Discovery was considered to be a procedure which would undermine the supposed advan-
tages of arbitration; see Callahan, Discovery in Construction Arbitration, 37 ARB. J. 3 (1982);
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scholars and practitioners have said that discovery can be efficacious in
arbitration to help narrow the issues, alleviate the need for live testimony
and elicit important facts in the sole possession of the other party.4
After a brief history of the origins and role of discovery, this article
discusses the usefulness of discovery in various arbitration settings by com-
paring the need for discovery in domestic and international arbitration. The
importance of discovery in international arbitration will be illustrated
through its use at the Iran-United States Claim Tribunal (hereinafter cited
as the Tribunal). After a survey of the Tribunal's discovery procedures,
standards, and enforcement mechanisms, the article focuses on the problem
of enforcement of discovery orders at the Tribunal. The article then suggests
alternative mechanisms for enforcement, and finally, it reaches several
conclusions concerning the efficacy of discovery in arbitration.
II. Background
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DISCOVERY
The origins of discovery employed in litigation in U.S. courts stem from
the British common law,5 and historians have traced the origins of English
discovery procedures back to Roman canon and civil law.6 From these
beginnings, procedures which gradually developed into modern discovery
practices spread through the English ecclesiastical courts to the courts of
chancery in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 7 Although the chancery
Goldman, A Proposed Arbitration Act for Kentucky, 22 ARB. J. 193(1967) reprinted in E. TEPLE
& R. MOBERLY, ARBITRATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 492, 494 (1979). But some say that
arbitration is not as simple and speedy as it is believed to be. See, e.g., Geokjian, The Conduct
of International Arbitration, 2 LAW. AMERICAS 409, 424 (1979).
4. See, e.g., Willenken, Discovery, supra note 3, at 16; Willenken, The Often Overlooked,
supra note 3, at 173; Robert, Administration of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, 1 Y.B. COM. ARB. 221, 223 (1976); Poppleton, The Arbitrator's Role in Expediting the
Large and Complex Commercial Case, 36 ARB. J. 6, 8 (1981); Audiotape Presentation by
Frederick A. 0. Schwartz, reprinted in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS 147 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Audiotape].
5. See generally Goldstein, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., W. BUCKLAND & A. MCNAIR, ROMAN AND COMMON LAW: A COMPARISON IN
OUTLINE 406 (2d. rev. 1952) [hereinafter cited as BUCKLAND]; Landfell, Discovery under the
Judicare Acts, 11 HARV. L. REV. 143 (1898); G. SPENCE, EQUITABLE JURISDICTION 228, (1846);
Scrutton, Roman Law Influence in Chancery, Church Courts, Admiralty, and Law Merchant,
cited in Goldstein, supra note 2, at 264; but see J. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES, 148
(1960).
Under the edict de edendo, the defendant had a right to compel the production of documents
from his adversary; however, the plaintiff was not afforded the same right. See Buckland,
supra, at 406. In addition, subpoenas and compulsory sworn interrogation originated in Roman
practice. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 265.
7. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 264. Interestingly, while discovery at common law was
impossible both because of the incapability of the parties to testify on their own behalf and
because these courts lacked the power to compel answers to interrogatories or production of
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procedures benefitted the chancellor more than the litigants, they furnished
the "seed for modern discovery." 8 The English common law judges were
finally given the authority to compel answers to documents and inspect
documents in the mid-nineteenth century.9 Similar authority was given to
American state common law judges at about the same time.10 Eventually,
discovery became a recognized device in federal civil practice in the United
States under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 11
B. DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
In the international arena, parties before international tribunals generally
have the right of discovery. 2 Parties have the right to the production of
documents that are in the sole possession of the opponent.' 3 In some cases,
document production has been ordered, even where the document was not
in the sole possession of the opponent, if the evidence was deemed to be
material. 14 Interrogatories and depositions, however, are much less com-
mon before international tribunals.1 5
The Rules of the International Court of Justice require that before hear-
ings are commenced, each party inform the Registry of the evidence which it
will put forward and that which it wants the Court to obtain.' 6 Article 49 of
documents, the courts of chancery did not suffer from these impediments. Id. at 258. The
chancellor, employing his authority as the representative of the king, was able to enforce his
orders to subpoena documents and compel testimony. Id. at 259.
8. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 259.
9. This authority was given under the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854. Id. at 266.
10. New York, for example, included discovery as a normal trial procedure. Id.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
The broad scope of the federal rules allows discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party .... "FED.
R. Civ. P. 26. In order to allow parties to obtain this information, the federal rules provide for a
variety of discovery methods:
depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production
of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and
other purposes; physical and mental examination; and requests for admission.
Id. In order to "meet the mounting criticism of uncontrolled overuse of discovery by attorneys
whose purpose appears to be the forcing of favorable settlement by driving up the costs of
litigation," the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules proposed several changes in Rule 26.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note (1983).
12. See D. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 98-9 (1975).
13. Id. at 99.
14. See id. at 100 citing to Pious Fund Case (United States v. Mexico) May 22, 1902, art. IV,
32 Stat. 1916, 19-, T.S. No. 408 (cited in book as 1 Malloy Treaties 1196).
15. Id. at 363-64. There are cases of deposing the adversary cited but these usually occur
before claims commissions. For example, the deposition of John Jay was admitted in Saint
Croix River Arbitration. Id. at 187.
16. I.C.J.R. art. 49. A list of names, descriptions, and addresses of the witnesses and experts
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the International Court Statute authorizes the court, before oral proceed-
ings, to order the parties to produce any document or supply any
explanations.' 7 If the party refuses, the Court takes formal note of the
refusal. 18 The Court has never exercised this power to take formal note. 19
Under Article 44 of the Statute, the Court can require a state to produce
evidence on the spot.20 Either upon request of one of the parties or sua
sponte, the International Court is empowered to take all of the necessary
measures to allow for the examinations of witnesses or experts not before
the Court. 2
1
III. Arbitration and Discovery
While the usefulness of liberal discovery in litigation may be in question,2 2
the question is even more debatable in arbitration. 23 Yet, many practition-
ers and legal journalists agree that a limited form of discovery is helpful in
the arbitration process.
24
A. DISCOVERY IN DOMESTIC ARBITRATION
Arbitral discovery in the United States is governed by a maze of federal 25
and state statutes26 and court decisions, as well as institutional rules such as
those promulgated by the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter
cited as the AAA). These rules can be divided into several categories:
"disallowance of discovery; discovery based upon recommendations of the
arbitrators; discovery based upon a showing of necessity or extraordinary
circumstances; discovery based upon a showing of no delay; or discovery as
the party intends to call as well as the relevancy of their testimony must be in the communica-
tions to the Court. Id.
17. Statute of the International Court of Justice, done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, art. 49 [hereinafter cited as I.C.J. Statute].
18. Id.
19. In the Corfu Channel case, Britain refused to p~roduce documents because it claimed they
were secret and related to an unfulfilled contingency. The International Court deemed the
document irrelevant and did not take formal note of the refusal. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.)
1949 I.C.J. 32.
20. I.C.J. Statute art. 44.
21. I.C.J.R. art. 56.
22. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
23. See supra notes 2 and 3 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Reynolds, Discovery in Arbitration, 18 FORUM 144 (1982); Willenken, Discov-
ery, supra note 3, at 16; G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO ARBITRATION 41 (1977).
25. See United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et. seq. (1925).
26. See, e.g., Uniform Arbitration Act § 1, et. seq. (1955) which was adopted by a majority of
the states.
VOL. 20, NO. 2
ARBITRAL DISCOVERY 503
a matter of right (not a rule adopted in its entirety in any known
jurisdiction)., 2 7
In the past, the federal courts have been reluctant to allow discovery in
arbitration although they have had the discretion to do so. 28 Despite this
hesitancy in granting discovery, the courts have allowed discovery in cases of
"exceptional circumstances." 29 In Bigge Crane,30 a New York district court,
reiterating the value of pretrial discovery-as a truth-seeking, time saving
and surprise-reducing mechanism-as well as the federal policy of support-
ing arbitration, called the lack of arbitral discovery "a throwback to the
outmoded 'sporting theory of justice."' 31 In granting pretrial examination
under a showing of "necessity," the court stated necessity existed where:
(1) ... the nature of any defense is unknown; (2) the amounts involved are so
substantial that any expense in taking depositions is relatively small; (3) the action
has proceeded to such a point that the taking of depositions can probably be
accomplished without delaying the arbitration ....
27. Willenken, The Often Overlooked, supra note 3, at 130.
The United States Arbitration Act, which governs contract arbitration concerning maritime,
interstate or foreign commerce, provides for limited discovery according to the discretion of the
arbitrator. The arbitrator can compel testimony from a witness and issue a subpoena duces
tecum to produce any document or record which is material to the case. 9 U.S.C. § 7. If any
person refuses to testify or produce a document, the arbitrators may petition the United States
district court for an order and if it is not obeyed, the party will be held in contempt of court. Id.
The Uniform Arbitration Act also provides for limited discovery but to a greater extent than
the U.S. Arbitration Act. The arbitrators can issue a subpoena to compel witnesses and the
production of documents or other evidence which is also backed up by court action. In addition,
at the discretion of the arbitrator, the act provides for depositions of witnesses who cannot
attend hearings.
The AAA Rules provide for a Pre-Hearing Conference at which parties can exchange
information. § 10. In regard to evidence, the rules state: "The parties ... shall produce such
additional evidence as the Arbitrator may deem necessary. . . . When the Arbitrator is
authorized by law to subpoena witnesses or documents, he may do so on his own initiative or
upon the request of any party." § 30. The AAA Rules are consensual unless they are part of the
agreement to arbitrate and the jurisdiction where the arbitration is to take place has an
arbitration statute which enforces the agreement to arbitrate. Callahan, supra note 7, at 8. For a
more detailed comparison of these rules, see generally Callahan, supra note 7, at 3; Willenken,
The Often Overlooked, supra note 6, at 173.
28. See, e.g., Foremost Yarn Mills v. Rose Mills, 25 F.R.D. 9 (E.D.Pa. 1960) (neither
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE nor United States Arbitration Act makes discovery
available in arbitration); Penn Tanker Co. of Delaware v. C.H.Z. Rolimpex, Warsaw, 199 F.
Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (depositions and interrogatories not used in arbitration unless
exceptional need); Commercial Solvents Corp v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D.
359 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (no discovery permitted because parties chose to avail themselves of
procedures peculiar to arbitral rather than judicial process).
29. See, e.g., Bigge Crane & Rigging Co. v. Docutel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 240 (E.D.N.Y.
1973); Recognition Equipment, Inc., v. NCR Corp., 532 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
30. Bigge Crane, 371 F. Supp. at 240.
31. Id. at 245, 246.
32. Id. at 246.
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In response to reasoning of this type, several states have passed statutes,
some based on the Uniform Arbitration Act, permitting discovery. 33 The
New York court, for example, adopted an "exceptional circumstances"34
test which the federal courts seemed to have also adopted. 35 Despite these
statutes, many courts have not granted discovery orders.36
1. Commercial Cases
In simple cases, or in cases where there is not a great deal of money at
stake, the value of discovery is probably not worth concomitant delay in the
proceedings because there is not a great need for documentary evidence and
the issues are already narrow. Complex commercial arbitration, on the
other hand, can be very expensive and time consuming.37 In such cases,
prehearing discovery can expedite the proceeding. 38 By presenting evidence
in documentary rather than verbal form, for example, by using deposition
testimony instead of live testimony at a hearing, the parties can save much
time. 39 This method is especially well suited for the testimony of "second-
ary" witnesses.4°
A procedural hearing before evidentiary proceedings begin (much the
same as that provided for in the AAA rules), at which the parties can discuss
the exchange of information and documents as well as scheduling guide-
lines, will also help expedite the case. 41 In order to promote smooth evi-
dentiary hearings, discovery should take place before, rather than during,
these hearings. 42 Production of documents directly relevant to the case can
be the least expensive form of discovery, especially from the point of view of
the party producing them.43 The production of books, records, or other
written evidence may eliminate the need for live testimony or a deposition
from a witness. If the kinds of documents to be discovered are limited to
33. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.07 (Anderson 1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 167
(1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-412 (1958); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 3102(c).
34. Application of Katz (Burken), 3 App. Div.2d 238, 160 N.Y.S. 2d 159 (1st Dept. 1957).
35. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
36. See generally Willenken, The Often Overlooked, supra note 3, at 174, for full discussion
of state court decisions.
37. For example, in one multimillion dollar case the parties thought that hearings would last
for over two years. See Poppleton, supra note 4, at 6.
38. The Maritime Law Association's Committee on Arbitration recognized the need for
discovery in big complex cases in order to reduce hearing time and the lack of information
presented at the proceedings. The Committee suggested the use of depositions, interrogatories,
and production of documents. MARITIME LAW Ass'N STANDING COMM. ON ARBITRATION INTERIM
REP. 10 (Nov. 1975).
39. See Poppleton, supra note 4, at 8.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 7.
42. See Reynolds, supra note 24, at 145.
43. See id. at 148.
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specific issues and if the party against whom discovery is taking place aids his
opponent in locating them, the production of documents can be a useful tool
in commercial arbitration. 44 Similarly, interrogatories should be focused
rather than comprised of overreaching questions that burden the opposing
party.45 It may be helpful for the arbitrator to limit the number of questions
to be asked.
In spite of the guidelines set by the arbitrator, there is always the possibil-
ity that time-consuming disputes will arise concerning the scope of discovery
and the adequacy of compliance.46 To avoid such disputes, parties to a
commercial contract can agree ahead of time to the nature of discovery to be
permitted if arbitration becomes necessary.47 Certain parameters should be
set in such an agreement; for instance, discovery can be provided for only if
the matter exceeds a certain amount. 48 Attorneys' fees and costs of discov-
ery can be regulated to discourage "fishing expeditions. 49
Another danger in employing discovery in commercial cases is the chance
that a party will obtain confidential information from his adversary. 50 Provi-
sion could be made to protect trade-secrets from discovery or for in camera
review. Discovery designed to harass could also damage a longstanding
relationship between the two sides. Often, businessmen choose to arbitrate
rather than litigate in order to preserve an amicable atmosphere. 51 Perhaps
the desire to continue the relationship itself will prevent the parties from
engaging in drawn-out discovery.
If the parties do seek court involvement before arbitrators are appointed
to obtain prearbitration information, they will busy the court (which is
probably overburdened already) in the arduous task of supervising the
procedures. 52 In fact, courts use this rationale to explain their cautiousness
in granting discovery in these circumstances. 53 Even after the arbitrators are
appointed, the determinations of the judge may influence the arbitrator(s)
in granting or denying future requests.54 Thus, discovery may sometimes
burden the courts and the arbitrator as well as the parties.
44. See id. Cases where a party points to a room full of files and tells his opponent to search
for as long as he likes should be avoided. Request for "all documents" related to a specific
contract should be denied also. Id.
45. See id. at 147.
46. See GOLDBERG, supra note 24, at 42.
47. See id. Parties can provide for discovery by explicitly stating so or by incorporating by
reference an agreement which allows for discovery. Reynolds, supra note 24, at 145.
48. See Willenken, Discovery, supra note 3, at 18.
49. See id. For example, if the requesting party is required to pay, it will discourage
unnecessary discovery. Id.
50. See id.
51. See Reynolds, supra note 24, at 148.
52. See GOLDBERG, supra note 24, at 41.
53. Id; see also supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
54. See GOLDBERG, supra note 24, at 41.
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2. Construction Cases
Construction arbitration often involves large, complicated cases. For this
reason, it may be useful to look at discovery in this area. Questions such as
whether the labor was done in a workmanlike manner or whether the
material used was of sufficient quality often can only be answered through
real or documentary evidence. 55 Real evidence can include "soil samples,
concrete coils, sections cut from steel beams, plugs from roofing and other
samples removed from the structure." 56 "Plans and related details, revisions
to the plans, specifications and addenda, vendor's drawings, shop drawings
and other data . . ." are documentary evidence. 57 Additional written com-
munications between the parties as well as advertisements, brochures, and
photographs may also prove invaluable in a construction case. 58 Discovery
will often be the only means by which this evidence can be uncovered; yet it
can require much time and money.
In order to balance these considerations, one arbitrator with experience
in the construction industry advocates limiting "requests for information to
requests that will contribute to the purposes of arbitration. Pre-arbitration
information should be requested within the system and backed by reason
and logic, rather than an attempt to impose a set of discovery rules from
another system of dispute resolution .... -59 In short, resort to extensive
discovery such as that specified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
construction arbitration, as in the other areas, will undermine the advan-
tages of speed, simplicity and privacy in arbitration. 60 Without some kind of
limitations, a party may be required to produce massive amounts of docu-
ments in an intricate case, only a fraction of which may be valuable. 6'
Moreover, the arbitrator's expertise in the subject matter should lessen the
need for such broad discovery. 62
In sum, the importance of documentary and material evidence as well as
the complex nature of the cases in construction arbitration highlight the
need for discovery in these cases although some limitations may make such
discovery of greater utility. If limited, depositions of the engineers, contrac-
tors, and subcontractors involved in the dispute may also be advantageous.
55. See Schwartz, Evidence in Construction Arbitration, 31 ARB. J. 248 (1976).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 249. For a full discussion of useful evidence in a construction case, see generally id.
59. Callahan, supra note 3, at 5. For example, discovery of the builder's original design
calculations in a truss failure to show if the truss was strong enough to support the structure
would be reasonable. Id.
60. Id. at 4.
61. See M. MUSTILL & S. BOYD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN
ENGLAND 285 (1982).
62. Id.
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3. Labor Cases
Except for the limited number of cases tried in federal district courts,
there is no uniform system for the production of evidence in the labor field. 63
Before turning to the efficacy of discovery in labor arbitration, a brief
description of the various statutes and court decisions concerning the pro-
duction of evidence may be instructive. 64
The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as NLRB),
has found that Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act
(hereinafter referred to as NLRA) 65 requires an employer to supply an
authorized bargaining agent with information necessary to the performance
of its obligations. 6 6 The duty to furnish information arises in connection with
both the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement and the settling of
grievances which arise during the course of the agreement.67 The Supreme
Court has held, however, that a union must make more than a simple
assertion that it needs information.68
With respect to grievance arbitration, the Supreme Court held in NLRB
v. Acme Industrial Co.6 9 that an employer must turn over to a union
information "necessary in order to enable the union to evaluate intelligently
the grievances filed."' 70 Before an arbitrator's determination of the rele-
vancy of the material requested, the NLRB may make a "threshhold deter-
mination concerning the potential relevance of . . . requested informa-
tion. ' '71 While the courts usually favor disclosure of information, in some
cases they have protected confidential information from discovery. 72
The duty to disclose information may also stem from a collective bargain-
ing agreement between the parties. If the agreement specifies discovery in
63. Comment, Fear and Loathing in Labor Arbitration: How Can There Possibly Be a Full
and Fair Hearing Unless theArbitrator Can Subpoena Evidence? 20 WILLAMETrE L.J. 535 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Comment].
64. For a full discussion of NLRB-imposed discovery, standards, see generally French,
Arbitral Discovery Guidelines for Employers, 50 UMKC L. REV. 141 (1982).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
66. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432(1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S.
149 (1956).
67. See, e.g., Acme Indus., 385 U.S. at 436; Truitt Mfg., 351 U.S. at 149; NLRB v. Custom
Excavating Inc., 575 F.2d 102, 106 (7th Cir. 1978).
68. Detroit Edison v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 30 (1979) (duty to supply information depends on
circumstances of each case).
69. 385 U.S. at 435.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 436. The "relevance" test announced in Acme is based on a broad "discovery-type
standard." See M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION 98 (1980).
72. See, e.g., Detroit Edison, 440 U.S. at 30 (psychological testing results not released to
union).
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order to negotiate and implement the agreement, the arbitrator will order
compliance with the agreement.
73
If either the union or employer refuses to comply with a discovery order,
the arbitrator can either exclude the evidence if later produced during the
arbitration or infer that the evidence was damaging to the refusing party. 74
In regard to a refusal to produce documents, one arbitrator wrote:
... He (the Arbitrator) may, however, give such weight as he deems appropriate
to the failure of a party to produce documents on demand. The degree of weight to
be attached to such failure will depend upon the relevancy of the documents
requested to the issues at hand. If the information would appear to be strongly
pertinent, the withholding of it may be vital in the making of a decision.
75
As will be shown below, these two procedures are essential in enforcing
compliance in international arbitration.
76
In addition to the arbitrator's internal procedural powers, the arbitrator
may issue a self-enforcing subpoena to induce compliance, possibly under
state law or the U.S. Arbitration Act. The Circuits disagree, however, as to
the applicability of the federal arbitration statute to collective bargaining
agreements.77 Two commentators have interpreted Section 301 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act to provide arbitrators with the necessary
authorization to issue subpoenas which are enforceable without the aid of
the courts. 78
The lack of arbitral compulsion power with regard to discovery seems to
be one of the biggest disadvantages of discovery in labor cases. 79 In the next
section, similar enforcement problems in international arbitration will be
demonstrated.8 ° Compelling discovery through the NLRB is a very lengthy
process. 81 If a party refuses to comply with an NLRB order for production of
documents and a court order is necessary, even more time will be
consumed.82
Disclosure of confidential information may be another danger in allowing
discovery in grievance arbitration as it is in commercial arbitration. Some
employers have argued that disclosure of certain materials will violate their
privacy rights as well as those of customers and employees not a party to the
73. See M. HILL, supra note 71, at 95. Parties should be careful to spell out disclosure
requirements, otherwise an arbitrator may hesitate to order it. See id.
74. See id. at 93.
75. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 6 LA 31 (1947) (Wallen, Arb.) cited in M.
HILL, supra note 92, at 93.
76. See infra notes 168-178 and accompanying text.
77. See Comment, supra note 63, at 555.
78. See M. HILL, supra note 71, at 96; Comment, supra note 63, at 556.
79. See generally, Comment, supra note 63.
80. See infra notes 122-127 and accompanying text.
81. See M. HILL, supra note 71, at 99. The process can take up to a year and a half. See H.R.
REP. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1977).
82. Id. at 537.
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arbitration.8 3 To the extent that an employer can show a clear and present
danger to employees, a clear privilege or a need for security, the informationwill 84
will be protected. Customer confidentiality, however, has not been upheld
as an excuse for refusing to furnish information.8 5 Similarly, an employer
may attempt to employ discovery to pry into protected union activity; such
requests have usually been denied.8 6 In camera inspection may be one
means of protecting the disclosure of confidential information.8 7 In some
cases, the use of discovery procedures in labor arbitration may undermine
the desire for confidentiality, a desire which often causes parties to choose
arbitration over litigation.
Reproduction of documents and labor costs in supervising review of
documents and in taking depositions can be costly to both sides.88 If the
division of costs is neither settled by law nor agreed upon, more time will be
wasted in bargaining on this issue.
89
On the whole, these disadvantages seem to be outwieghed by the clarifica-
tion prearbitration disclosure can bring to the proceedings. On this issue,
one arbitrator said:
Apart from specific rules, it is a salutary principle of arbitration procedure that
both parties to the dispute be accorded a full and complete hearing and an
opportunity to present such evidence, documentary or otherwise, as is germane to
the issues, without regard to whether one or another party has possession or
custody of such evidence. The object and purpose of arbitration is to arrive at a fair
and just decision, and to this end parties should be assisted in obtaining competent
and material evidence where such production may reasonably be had, ... "
The underlying theory for permitting discovery in any kind of arbitration is
the belief that it will engender a full and fair hearing in bringing to light all of
the relevant and material evidence in a case. 9 1 In labor, essential documents
are often held by one party.92 In a discipline case, for instance, the union
may require certain documents held by an employer such as the grievant's
83. See French, supra note 64, at 159.
84. See id. at 161.
85. See, e.g., NLRB v. Custom Excavating, Inc., 575 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1978); Transport of
N.J., 233 N.L.R.B. 694 (1977).
86. See, e.g., Cook Paint & Varnish Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also
French, supra note 64, at 162.
87. See Local Lodge 1746, International Association of Machinists v. Pratt & Whitney
Division of United Aircraft Corp., 329 F. Supp. 283 (D. Conn. 1971).
88. See French, supra note 64, at 154.
89. See id.
90. C & P Telephone Co. of West Virginia, 2 LA 367 (1953) (Dworkin, Arb.) cited in M.
HILL, supra note 71, at 94.
91. See Comment, supra note 63, at 565.
92. See id. at 543.
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past work record and records of how past employees were disciplined for a
like offense in order to ascertain the merits of the grievance.93 In this way,
discovery can aid the union in distinguishing nonmeritorious grievances.
94
Other information held by the employer that may be useful to the union in
arbitration can include (depending on the nature of the grievance): wage
data, Equal Employment Opportunity data, production standards, wage
and benefit data, job evaluations and descriptions, time study data, financial
data, subcontracting information, physical plant layout and customer
information. 9
5
The employer, too, may require information held by the union. For
example, where there are several employers to an agreement with one union
and an employer believes the agreement is being enforced against him but
not the other employers, discovery of union records will be crucial in
substantiating the complaining employer's assertion.96 Statements of
coworkers and management personnel can be important in either manage-
ment's or labor's case.97 A deposition may save the expense of having
witnesses take time from work to testify. If a party refuses to be deposed,
some arbitrators have adopted a negative inference from the refusal as they
would for a refusal to testify. 98
To a certain extent, parties to a labor arbitration will voluntarily disclose
information, reducing the need for discovery procedures, possibly due to
the ongoing nature of their relationship. Moreover, since the parties are
experienced in dealing with each other, they may already have knowledge of
the facts pertinent to a case.
In general, the efficacy of domestic arbitral discovery will depend on the
specific nature of the arbitration. Discovery in simple claims or cases with
small amounts of money at stake is inexpedient. Complex commercial
claims, especially in the construction area where a significant amount of
documentary and material evidence is essential in presenting a case, lend
themselves well to the employment of discovery. Prearbitral discovery in
labor arbitration may also be requisite in certain types of disputes; however,
voluntary exchange of information as well as the parties' past practices and
encounters can sometimes substitute for the utilization of discovery. Be-
cause of the lack of uniformity in the present array of rules, enforcement of
discovery orders may pose a problem in labor arbitration. Unless specifically
protected, discovery may result in the disclosure of confidential information
93. See id.
94. See French, supra note 64, at 156.
95. See Comment, supra note 63, at 143, 145-48.
96. See Davidson, Brick Co. v. United States Brick & Clay Workers, 31 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
752 (1958) (Jones, Arb.).
97. See Comment, supra note 63, at 542-43.
98. See Jaeger Machine Co., 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 850, 852 (1970) (High, Arb.); S. H.
Grossinger Inc., 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) (1972) (Kaplan, Arb.).
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in both labor and commercial settings. One commentator's summary of the
factors which courts consider in granting prearbitral disclosure highlights
the efficacy of discovery in certain situations:
Important information is exclusively within the possession of hostile witnesses; the
claim is very large; the issues are complex; documents are essential to proving a
party's case; the opponent's defense is unknown to the claimant; the cost of
discovery compared to the magnitude of the claim is slight; discovery probably can
be accomplished without delaying arbitration; and the identity of potentially liable
persons is unknown. 9
9
The above considerations are similar to those the U.S. federal district courts
are required to take into account when limiting discovery under Rule26(b)(1).1 °°
B. DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
To illustrate the efficacy of discovery in international arbitration, the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal will be examined. At the outset, it is
important to note that the Tribunal is different from many international
arbitral tribunals because it is not an ad hoc body set up for a single case but a
panel established to settle thousands of claims arising from a particular
event. 10' Only minimal guidance in establishing the Tribunal was provided
99. See Willenken, Discovery, supra note 3, at 17.
100. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
101. For an in-depth look at the Tribunal, see generally Stewart & Sherman, Developments at
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: 1981-1983, 24 VA. L. REV. 1 (1983); see also Selby &
Stewart, Practical Aspects of Arbitrating Claims Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,
18 INT'L LAW. 211 (1984); Stewart, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: A Review of
Developments: 1983-84, 16 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 677 (1984). A brief description of the
Tribunal is ventured here.
The Tribunal was created under the so-called Algiers Accords, see 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1
(1981), 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981), the 1981 agreement mediated by the Popular Republic of Algeria
between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran which resulted in the liberation of
the diplomatic hostages seized in 1979 in Iran. Comprised of two different declarations and
three implementing or supporting documents, the Accords obligated the United States to keep
out of Iranian internal affairs, remove trade sanctions, and to arrange for the transfer of Iranian
assets frozen in response to several events, including the capture of fifty-two Americans at the
U.S. Embassy in Tehran, as well as Iran's announced intention to withdraw its assets from the
United States and to repudiate its debts to U.S. citizens. Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, January 19, 1981,81 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1 (1981), 20
I.L.M. 224 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Declaration]. The United States froze about $12 billion
worth of Iran's assets located both in the United States and abroad.
In addition to the political crisis during the period the hostages were held, the Islamic
Revolution created economic havoc between the two countries-contracts were broken,
irrevocable letters of credit were dishonored, U.S. property and investments in Iran were
expropriated, American workers in Iran were expelled and trade dropped from $5.7 billion in
1977 to $501 million in 1980. (See Stewart & Sherman, supra, at 2). As a result of the economic
chaos during the hostage crisis, American citizens attached the frozen assets in both domestic
and foreign courts pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 535. Id. at 3. Merely unfreezing the assets in return
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in the Algiers Accords. 102 The arbitrators themselves were faced with the
for the release of the hostages would not solve economic chaos-an alternative means for
compensating U.S. nationals had to be devised. d. Consequently, the Claims Settlement
Agreement established the mechanism chosen for resolution of the dispute-a nine-member
international arbitral panel to which claims could be presented. (Declaration of the Govern-
ment of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims
by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, January 19, 1981, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1 (1981), 20 I.L.M. 230 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Claims Settlement Agreement]).
The Tribunal, which consists of three Iranians, three Americans, and three third-country
arbitrators chosen by the original six arbitrators, can hear cases en banc or in Chambers.
(Claims Settlement Agreement, arts. 11(1) & 111(1)). Each of the three chambers is composed
of one Iranian, one American and one neutral arbitrator. The Tribunal may also be expanded in
multiples of three if Iran and the United States deem it necessary. (Claims Settlement Agree-
ment, art. III(1)).
The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear claims based on debts, contracts, expropriations and
other measures affecting property rights brought by U.S. citizens against Iran or Iranian
nationals against the United States. Claims Settlement Agreement, art. II(1). In addition, the
Tribunal is empowered to hear official claims between the two states based on contracts for the
sale of goods and services, interpretative disputes regarding the interpretation or performance
of the two Declarations, and certain claims between Iranian and U.S. Banks. (See Selby &
Stewart, supra, at 212). In the interpretative disputes (the "A" claims), and the official claims
(the "B" claims), the United States is represented by the Department of State. In the private
claims under $250,000 (the "small" claims), the American party is also represented by the U.S.
Department of State. Private counsel represent American nationals with claims for $250,000 or
more (the "large" claims). (See Claims Settlement Agreement, art. 111(3)). Most of the claims
filed (over 3,000) are claims by U.S. nationals against Iran. (Selby, supra note 122, at 215).
The breakdown of claims is as follows:
type of
submitted by against claim #
U.S. Gov't on Iranian Gov't Small 2,782
behalf of U.S.
nationals
U.S. nationals Iranian Gov't Large 520
U.S. Gov't Iranian Gov't Interpretative 20
& Official
Iranian nationals U.S. Gov't Large 24
or Iranian Gov't on & small
behalf of Iranian
nationals
Iranian Gov't U.S. Gov't Interpretative 20
& Official
Iranian Gov't U.S. nationals * 1,400
See id.
*These claims were withdrawn in 1982, probably because the Tribunal held that it did not
have jurisdiction over "direct" claims by one government against the citizens of another. See
Case No. A/2, 21 I.L.M. 78 (1982). To further insure payment of awards, all Tribunal decisions
and awards are "final and binding" and enforceable against either party "in the courts of any
nation in accordance with its laws." Claims Settlement Agreement. Supra, arts. IV (1) & (2).
102. See supra note 101.
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task of implementing the day-to-day operations of the Tribunal. 10 3 The
Accords did, however, specify that the Tribunal would follow the Arbitra-
tion Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(hereinafter cited as UNCITRAL Rules) with such revisions as they might
deem necessary. 10 4 A fair amount of revision of the UNCITRAL Rules
10 5
was necessary due to the fact that they were primarily designed for use in ad
hoc commercial arbitration between two private parties.1
0 6
In studying any aspect of the Tribunal, it is important to keep in mind the
context in which it was created. Two commentators with firsthand knowl-
edge have written:
Historically, international claims tribunals have been created at the end of a
period of conflict ... with the goal of resolving outstanding disputes between the
participating governments, in the context of resumed diplomatic and commercial
relations. In contrast, this Tribunal was established in the midst of intense political
confrontation by governments which had (and continue to have) neither diplo-
matic relations nor the . . . objective of reestablishing such relations. °7
Moreover, all of the claims stem from one major event-the Iranian Islamic
Revolution and its repercussions. Accordingly, the Islamic ideology and its
anti-Western, anti-American stance directly affect the arbitral process.'
0 8
Because the Tribunal handles claims based on both private and public
international law, the mixture and tension between the two often leads to
unique and unforeseen results. 10 9
IV. Discovery at the Tribunal
A. FRAMEWORK
The Tribunal has adopted UNCITRAL Rule 24 (without revision) con-
cerning evidence:
1. Each party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to support his
claim or defence.
2. The arbitral tribunal, may, if it considers it appropriate, require a party to
103. See Selby & Stewart, supra note 101, at 213.
104. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 101, art. 111(2). The United Nations
promulgated the UNCITRAL Rules in 1976 for use in both institutionally-aided and privately-
run arbitrations. See Aksen, The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules-An Early Comment, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION 1-2 (J. Schultz & A. Vandenberg eds.
1982).
105. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Final Rules of Procedure, May 3, 1983, reprinted in
2 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 405 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Tribunal Rules].
106. See Aksen, supra note 104, at 5.
107. See Selby & Stewart, supra note 101, at 216.
108. See id. For instance, there was one incident in the early Fall, 1984 when two of the
Iranian arbitrators physically attacked one of the neutral arbitrators allegedly for his "pro-
American" decisions.
109. See id. at 218.
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deliver to the tribunal and to the other party, within such a period of time as the
arbitral tribunal shall decide, a summary of the documents and other evidence
which that party intends to present in support of the facts in issue set out in his
statement of claim or statement of defence.
3. At any time during the arbitral proceedings the arbitral tribunal may require
the parties to produce documents, exhibits or other evidence within such period of
time as the tribunal shall determine.
110
In addition, Rule 27 provides for the appointment of an expert to report to
the Tribunal "on specific issues to be determined by the tribunal.""' The
parties are required to "give the expert any relevant information or produce
for his inspection any relevant documents or goods that he may require of
them. ' '" 2 Any dispute over the relevance of required information or pro-
duction will be settled by the Tribunal. 1 3 The Tribunal added to the
UNCITRAL Rule: "The expert shall invite a representative of each arbi-
trating party to attend any site inspection, and, when the arbitral tribunal so
determines, a representative of each arbitrating party shall be invited to
attend other inspections made by the expert.""1
4
An order for the production of documents or for the appointment of an
expert may result from a request from either party or from the Tribunal
acting on its own accord. While there have been a number of cases where the
Tribunal, without request of either party, has ordered the production of
documents or other evidence 1 5 and a few cases where it has appointed an
expert, 1 6 this article focuses on those cases where a request was made by
either an American or Iranian party' 17 and on the requests made for
110. Tribunal Rules, supra note 105, art. 24; see also UNCITRAL Rules, art. 24.
111. Tribunal Rules, supra note 105, art. 27(1); see also UNCITRAL Rules, art. 27(1).
112. Id. at art. 24(2).
113. Id.
114. Tribunal Rules, supra note 105, art. 24(2).
115. For example, the Tribunal has ordered parties to produce documentary proof of
patents, corporate ledgers, balance sheets, bank statements, asset and account documents,
copies of decisions in the Iranian courts and invoices.
116. Before an American party can reach the merits of a case, it must show that it is a United
States national. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 101, at art. VII(1); see also Stewart
& Sherman, supra note 101, at 20. In order to preserve the confidentiality of corporate
shareholders names in one case, the Tribunal ordered an expert to inspect the corporate books
and records and thereafter render a report on the nationality of the shareholders without
including the shareholders' names. Subsequent to the filing of the report, Chamber One
allowed respondent the opportunity to inspect the underlying data used by the expert. Pursuant
to Rule 41(2) the Tribunal may provide that a party must deposit a sum of money with the
Tribunal to cover the cost of the expert. The Tribunal later decides which party will ultimately
bear the cost.
117. With permission of the appropriate parties, the author has examined certain of the
discovery requests and orders of the Tribunal. Some of these requests and orders are not
publicly available. Certain parties have consented to reference to their cases but have asked
that their names not be identified. Thus, for the sake of confidentiality, no references will be
made to the names or numbers of any of the cases.
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documentary evidence. There is no provision in the rules for either inter-
rogatories or depositions. 118
B. REQUESTS AT THE TRIBUNAL
As yet, there have been no requests for the production of documents in
the small claims. In the large claims, fifteen U.S. claimants (one claimant
made the same request in three claims) have requested documents from
either the Government of Iran or an Iranian entity; two Iranian entities have
requested documents from American claimants. The United States Govern-
ment has requested documents from an Iranian national in one case. In the
official claims, Iran has requested documents from the United States in one
case; the United States has made the same request in eleven similar cases. 119
In one interpretative dispute which has been divided into a number of
smaller claims, the United States and Iran have each made a request.
Prehearing conferences are scheduled on many claims at the Tribunal.
Document requests can be made prior to or during these prehearing confer-
ences. In practice, claimants have been more likely to get a quicker response
from the Tribunal if they submit written requests before the prehearing
conference. Such requests can be made in a separate letter or motion to the
Tribunal or incorporated in other submissions. Successful document re-
quests typically include specific identification of the document(s) and their
location as well as an explanation of why they are necessary, why the
claimant does not have access to them and the "reasonable steps" taken to
obtain the documents. 12
0
In one case in which an American company has a claim for films leased to
an Iranian television station, which were never returned, and for unpaid film
rental charges, a request was made for: "all documents and records" belong-
ing to the claimant left in the Tehran office; "all documents and records"
relating to transactions between claimant's subsidiary and the Iranian TV
station; and "all films and film materials in possession or control" of the
station or "any instrumentality or licensee of the station.... " Chamber Two
of the Tribunal denied this request because the claimant neither specified
the documents it wanted nor described the steps it had taken to try to acquire
the necessary materials. The Tribunal did indicate that it would be willing to
accept an amended request which would include a more precise list of the
118. The efficacy of these procedures will be discussed in the next section, see infra notes
132-138 and accompanying text.
119. In seven of these cases, a U.S. request for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is pending. In
one instance, Iran withdrew the case because it was identical to another case they had filed.
120. See Selby, supra note 122, at 225.
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requested documents. A more detailed request was submitted and is still
pending before the Tribunal.
Various types of documents have been requested in the cases at the
Tribunal: general ledgers; balance sheets; audit reports; bank statements;
deposit slips; communications between Iranian government entities; con-
tracts; minutes of shareholder meetings; Statements of Defense filed in
other cases; excerpts from the Trade Register in Tehran compiled by the
Registration office where all companies in Iran are required to register;
certain documents Iranian companies were required to file with the Ministry
of Finance such as financial statements and tax returns; certified public
accountant statements of assets and liabilities; sales records filed in the Iran
Registry of Official Documents; real estate records; construction documents
such as drawings, blueprints, material invoices, design specifications; rec-
ords maintained at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran concerning its routine
functions including invoices from such Iranian agencies as the Telecom-
munication Company of Iran.
C. TRIBUNAL ORDERS
In almost every case where a reasonably defined request for discovery was
made, the Tribunal has ordered the production of the requested items. In
many cases, document requests are still pending before the Tribunal. Occa-
sionally, before issuing an order, the Tribunal has asked for the voluntary
production of documents or asked the party to ask its opponent directly for
the evidence. For instance, in one case where the Iranian respondent was
having trouble locating financial data, the Tribunal, in a written request,
asked the American claimant to submit the documents if they were avail-
able. In another case where there was a deficient request (request was too
general and failed to give any information as to what other efforts were
made to locate the documents), Chamber One requested the Agent of
Iran1 21 to aid the claimant in obtaining the necessary documents. Although
the claimant sent a letter to the Iranian Agent requesting specified docu-
ments, the claimant has not been successful in obtaining them. In fact, Iran
in its statement of defense, pointed to the fact that the claimant has failed to
document its case.
A deficiency in the request is one of the only bases relied on by the
Tribunal in denying requests. In a few instances, the Tribunal has suspended
an order for production or postponed making a decision until a preliminary
jurisdictional question is settled. In the past year or so, the Tribunal has
121. Iran and the United States each have a representative at the Tribunal in The Hague to
submit filings and act as an agent for their respective countries.
VOL. 20, NO. 2
ARBITRAL DISCOVERY 517
made it a practice to ask the opposing party to reply to a request for
documents before issuing an order. The Tribunal's standards upon which
production is ordered is summed up in this statement from one of its orders:
... the Tribunal will consider any request the [c]laimant may wish to make for an
order for the production of specified documents by the [r]espondent, provided
such request is justifiable and the Tribunal is satisfied that all reasonable steps have
been taken by the [c]laimant to obtain the specific documents in question. (em-
phasis added).
The claimant must show that he is unable to obtain the document through
alternative channels, probably because it is in the sole possession of his
opponent. Thus, the Tribunal standard is much narrower than the all
relevant information standard employed in the U.S. courts or standards
used in other kinds of arbitration.
This standard, however, is not difficult to meet in light of the circum-
stances in which the claims arose. A letter sent to the proper Iranian
authority, requesting the document(s) in question would most likely meet
the "all reasonable steps" standard. As indicated above, all of the disputes
resulted from the Islamic Revolution in Iran during which dozens of con-
tracts were terminated and hundreds of American citizens were expelled,
often under violent and hurried circumstances. Consequently, many Amer-
ican citizens and companies were forced to leave behind all of their files
and/or possessions. Company offices were often expropriated and Amer-
icans' homes ransacked. Due to the lack of diplomatic relations between
Iran and the United States, it is very difficult for American lawyers to travel
to Iran to retrieve the documents or obtain them without the aid of an
intervening power. One claimant wrote, for instance: "The gathering of
evidence and proof to support my claims has been exceptionally difficult by
reason of the previous confiscation of the Government of all of the records,
papers and files of ... Company, Ltd." Indeed, one of the grounds relied
upon by the Agent for the United States in a letter to Judge Nils Mangard,
former Chairman of the Tribunal, which objected to a Tribunal order which
appointed an expert to inventory properties in the United States for an
Iranian entity, was the fact that U.S. claimants "never received comparable
assistance from the Tribunal in compelling discovery even though it is
frequently impossible for them to make their own investigation or even to gain
access to their own relevant records left in Iran." (emphasis added).
Iranian parties may also have difficulty in obtaining evidence in the
United States. For instance, in the aforementioned case in which the Tri-
bunal appointed an expert for an onsite inspection and inventory, several
issues were raised including the availability of visas for Iranians and U.S.
security interests. Although the U.S. Agent sought to facilitate issuance of
the necessary visas so that the inspection could take place, he could not
guarantee that they would be available because such decisions are made by
SPRING 1986
518 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
consular officers on a case-by-case basis. The inspection and inventory was
successfully completed, however.
D. ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS
Although production orders may be procured with relative ease, securing
compliance with the orders is often difficult. In the large claims, only five of
the ten orders for production were fully complied with. In two of these cases,
American claimants supplied the Iranian respondents with the requested
materials. Iranian respondents "partially" complied in three cases-one in
which unrequested documents were submitted but not those requested and
two others in which only some of the requested evidence was furnished. In
one case, the Iranians submitted one document, a title deed, but stated that
two other documents, contracts, could not be found or traced. Examining
the three cases where Iran fully obeyed the production order is particularly
telling: only one or two easily accessible documents were requested in each
case (a contract, statements of defense filed in other claims and a letter); in
all of the cases, the document produced either favored or did not damage the
Iranian party's case.
Although U.S. requests for the production of documents have been
pending in ten official claims since 1982, no orders have been granted as
yet. 122 In one large claim against the U.S. Department of Defense, where
the Tribunal ordered the parties to exchange documents through their
respective agents, both parties complied and are preparing a joint report to
show the status of efforts to reconcile discrepancies. Because Iran was the
claimant in this case, it was in a position to gain from its acquiescence in the
informal discovery procedures.
In an interpretative dispute against the United States, Iran delivered the
requested documents. Iran's request for documents in another claim in the
same interpretative dispute was assented to by the United States and a joint
report on the status of the document exchange has been filed. Finally, a U.S.
request for discovery in a case brought against it by an Iranian national has
been pending before Chamber Two since September 1982.
On the whole, there has been a great lack of compliance, especially by
Iran, with Tribunal discovery orders. Excuses such as that the documents
have been destroyed or cannot be located might be plausible in light of the
upheaval the Islamic Revolution caused. Requested U.S. films (mentioned
above), no doubt, were destroyed in an effort to rid the new Islamic
Republic of all American influence. Also, in some cases, the parties may not
even be aware of the documents in their possession. Iran's outright refusals
122. See supra note 119.
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to produce documents, denials that the party has the right to ask for
documents, or claims that the opponent did not comply with Iran's request
for documents when there was no order for such documents, however, are
unjustifiable excuses aimed at delay. At bottom, the refusals to cooperate in
discovery probably stem from the aforementioned political nature of the
Tribunal. One claimant's attorney postulated that the lack of compliance is
partly due to bad faith and partly due to a lack of understanding of discovery
procedures, especially those used by the Americans. 123 Yet, in a startling
admission, Iran has contradicted itself in one of its memorials by admitting
the duty to disclose all relevant documents before international tribunals:
... a universally accepted rule of evidence before international tribunals can be
relied upon: that one which makes a duty for each party to disclose any fact, to
submit every document which is in his possession. As for American corporations
putting forward a claim before the Tribunal they have the duty to produce every
document which could be significant for the facts to be proven. No objection of
confidentiality could be raised would the evidence be relevant for the function an
international Tribunal has the power to assume. [sic].
This position on the obligation of an American party has not affected
Iran's own practice, however. The Tribunal's response to the lack of com-
pliance from Iran has been relatively ineffective. Under the Tribunal Rules,
the arbitral panel has the following means of enforcement if a party has
failed to submit evidence in support of its claims:
If one of the parties, duly invited to produce documentary evidence, fails to do so
within the established period of time, without showing sufficient cause for such
failure, the arbitral tribunal may make the award on the evidence before it.
124
The Tribunal has rarely utilized this enforcement provision. In only three
cases did the Tribunal announce its intention to proceed under Article 28(3)
of the rules. In one case, a U.S. claimant failed to respond at all to an order
for documentary evidence. This order was aimed at an American claimant
whose files had been seized in Iran. The claimant then responded with a
discovery request which was granted by the Tribunal. Subsequently, the
Iranian agent protested and requested the case be decided on the pleadings
and documents before the Tribunal at the time the original order was filed.
In another case, the respondents, after having been granted ten months of
extensions for filing their counter-briefs, requested a further extension.
Chamber Three reminded respondents of the possible consequences under
Rule 28 if they failed to comply with the Tribunal's orders and further held
that it would consider claimant's request for monetary sanctions if the filing
deadline was ignored by the respondents.
Finally, Chamber Three, in another case in which respondents were
123. Tribunal Rules, supra note 105, art. 28(3); see also UNCITRAL Rules, art. 28(3).
124. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
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granted numerous extensions, threatened to proceed under Rule 28 if the
respondents failed to file their statement of defense on time. Some U.S.
claimants have skillfully attempted to use this rule against Iran when Iran
has refused to produce documents which the U.S. claimant requested in
order to support its claims. For example, when a U.S. national had only
secondary evidence as to the existence of a contract between itself and an
Iranian ministry, it asked the Tribunal to make an award on the evidence
before it if the Iranian respondent failed to produce the actual requested
contract, Another U.S. claimant made a similar pleading in regard to its
secondary evidence as to amounts owed on the failure to return leased
property.
Chamber Three, in response to a U.S. claimant's demand for a full
explanation as to why certain documents were not produced (alleging that it
was impossible that the Iranian respondent did not have the named docu-
ments), concluded that the explanation offered by the respondent was
inadequate and ordered the respondent to reply specifically to each item
rquested. The respondent did file its explanation but still maintained that it
had no further evidentiary matter at its disposal.
In the past, the Tribunal has been willing, perhaps too willing, to grant
generous extensions for submission deadlines. 125 It has not been uncommon
for the Tribunal to allow at least three, three-month extensions to one party
in a claim. The elapsed time between a document request and a final
compliance can range fromone month in a very simple request to two or
more years. Since the Tribunal now gives opponents the opportunity to
reply to a request for documents, the process has even been more time
consuming; some parties may take as long as a year just to respond to a
discovery motion. Such delays cause the requesting party much frustration
and resentment; one attorney sent nine angry letters and telexes over the
space of a year to the Tribunal protesting extensions granted to the Iranians.
The attorney termed Iran's failure to produce the ordered documents as an
"abiding contempt for the Tribunal's authority." Finally, six months after
the Tribunal's original production order was filed, Chamber Two declared
that it found "no reason to extend the final deadline for the filing of these
documents."
As shown previously, a party can abuse discovery procedures by request-
ing unnecessary documents. 126 Yet, it is often difficult to determine whether
delays are caused by real difficulties in obtaining evidence or by a deliberate
attempt to stall the proceedings. In an effort to make such a determination,
Chamber Two, in response to a request for an eight-month extension after
125. Cf. Stewart & Sherman, supra note 101, at 16.
126. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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several prior extensions totalling seven months had been given, ordered the
Iranian party to suby ,it a progress report describing the extent to which
evidence had been gathered, problems encountered in the process, and the
likelihood that the process would ever be completed. Subsequently, in its
progress report, the respondent filed a discovery request with which the
claimant complied. Further delays were encountered when the respondent
needed more time to examine the disclosed documents "which comprised of
seventeen boxes weighing two hundred and fifty-two kilograms and
thousands of pages" [sic]. In turn, the claimant objected to further exten-
sions because it noted that none of the documents were critical to the
respondent's defense and because most of the documents were duplicates
already in the respondent's possession. Apparently ignoring the claimant's
assertions, the Tribunal extended the filing deadline for respondent's rebut-
tal brief seven months. More recently, however, the Tribunal seems a bit
more strict with filing deadlines by threatening to proceed under Rule 28.
This change may be due to the new leadership at the Tribunal.
E. EFFICACY OF DISCOVERY AT THE TRIBUNAL
In view of the lax enforcement of discovery orders and the amount of time
wasted in trying to secure compliance at the Tribunal, discovery may appear
futile. On the other hand, discovery may be the only means of substantiating
or defending a claim before the Tribunal. As illustrated above, records and
books are often inaccessible to the parties. Judge Richard Mosk recognized
this reality in his concurring opinion in Utrasystems Inc. v. Iran:127
The parties and the Tribunal operated under difficult circumstances. Of the two
key witnesses, one is deceased and the other is incarcerated in Iran. Other
witnesses were unavailable. Claimant did not have access to certain documents
and witnesses. There were various discrepancies among those documents pro-
duced. Restriction on travel between Iran and the United States, the lack of
relations between the two countries, the age of the claim and language differences
exacerbated proof problems. Of course, it is not unusual for Tribunals such as this
one to be 'compelled to act upon the basis of meager, incomplete, and unsatisfac-
tory evidence.' Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribunals 22 (1975).128
In R. N. Pomeroy v. Iran,'29 Chamber Three adopted this view: "Recogniz-
ing the difficulties parties have in producing all of the evidence, the Tribunal
notes that when there are unexplained gaps in the evidence the Tribunal has
no choice but to rely on inferences it can make from the known cir-
cumstances."
130
127. Award No. 27-84-3 (March 4, 1983), 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 100 (1984).
128. Id. at 115 (Mosk, J., concurring).
129. Award No. 50-40-3 (June 8, 1983), 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 384 (1984).
130. Id. at 384.
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As pointed out by Judge Mosk, key witnesses are often unavailable or are
unwilling to testify. It is undeniably costly for a witness to travel from either
the United States or Iran to the proceedings in The Netherlands. Furth-
ermore, a U.S. or Iranian citizen who may have firsthand knowledge, may
be reluctant to testify against his own countrymen. For example, one Iranian
witness who actually saw the confiscation of claimant's property refused to
appear at the Tribunal in fear of Iranian reprisals against himself and his
family; he agreed only to an anonymous affidavit. This situation illustrates
another problem at the Tribunal: the lack of power to compel testimony.
Article 16(2) of the Tribunal Rules provides that the Tribunal can hear
witnesses allowing it to summon them. 131 Other institutional rules also
provide for the summoning of witnesses. 13 Part of the problem could
possibly be remedied through the use of discovery procedures such as
depositions or interrogatories. An imprisoned witness, such as the one
referred to by Judge Mosk above, could be ordered to answer interrogato-
ries. Such a procedure would be useful if the Tribunal had sufficient power
to enforce it. One commentator has reported the beneficial use of such
procedures in both the German-Mexican and the French-Mexican Claims
Commissions. 133
Besides its utility in gathering crucial evidence, discovery can often be
effective in inducing settlements. 134 Of the approximate twenty-two docu-
ment requests at the Tribunal, two of the cases in which requests were made
were settled between the parties. 135 In another case, it is hoped that a
discovery request may lead to settlement. In neither of the two settlement
cases, both large claims in which an American claimant sought documents
from an Iranian respondent, were the documents ever produced. It is
difficult to speculate at this point but it is plausible that the documents
requested were so damaging that the respondent decided to settle. On the
other hand, in light of the lack of compliance, it is doubtful whether the
131. Tribunal Rules, supra note 137, art. 16(2); see also UNCITRAL Rules, art. 16(2). As
stated above, Article 24(3) empowers the arbitrators to require the parties to produce docu-
ments, exhibits, or other evidence but this would not seem to include witnesses. Tribunal Rules,
art. 24(3) (emphasis added). For a discussion of compelling testimony under the UNCITRAL
Rules in general, see Stein & Wotman, International Commercial Arbitration in the 1980's: A
Comparison of the Major Arbitral Systems and Rules, 38 Bus. LAW. 1685, 1707 (1983).
132. See International Chamber of Commerce Rules [hereinafter cited as ICC Rules], arts.
14(1), 15(1), reprinted in GUIDE TO ARBITRATION 70 (1983).
133. See A. FELLER, THE MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSIONS 257 (1935). In the Italian-Mexican
Claims Commission, however, it was held that similar procedures were not available where the
governments were litigants. Id.
134. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 267.
135. In one of the cases, an Award on Agreed Terms was filed. An Award on Agreed Terms,
provided for in Article 34 of the Tribunal Rules, allows the parties to record a settlement in the
form of an arbitral award and to effect payment through the Security Account. See Tribunal
Rules, supra note 105, at art. 34(1).
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documents would have ever been actually produced. Hence, in order for
discovery to induce settlement, the parties must believe that they will be
forced to produce damaging evidence or that the arbitrators will either draw
a negative inference or be disinclined to believe their explanations if they fail
to produce such evidence. 13
6
Discovery is also heralded as a means of uncovering relevant facts in the
"search for truth.' ' 137 A decision has been reached in two of the approx-
imately twenty-two cases in which document requests were made. In one
case in which a U.S. national claimed that it was retained by an Iranian
agency to be consulting engineer, the American claimant sought the produc-
tion of correspondence that would prove the existence of this contractual
relationship. The Iranians did produce the requested letter. In its award to
the American claimant, the Tribunal presumed the existence of the contrac-
tual relationship from letters, Telexes, minutes of meetings and other data.
Therefore, the document produced appears to have aided the Tribunal in
uncovering the relevant facts.
In another case, copies of submissions the respondents had previously
filed in other cases, on which respondent had relied in the case at the bar,
were provided to the American claimant. Claimant received a substantial
award but it does not appear the document influenced the decision. 138
If the enforcement and delay difficulties could be resolved (suggestions to
resolve these problems will be discussed below), 139 discovery would seem to
be a very helpful device at the Tribunal. Parties probably have no alternative
means of evidencing their claims. In some cases, production requests may
engender settlement negotiations and in others it may aid the Tribunal in
reaching a fair decision in a case.
V. Efficacy of Discovery in Domestic
and International Arbitration
A. DIFFERENCES
The problems encountered by parties before the United States-Iran
Claims Tribunal in gathering evidence, both documentary and testimonial,
demonstrate the problems that parties have in obtaining evidence in interna-
tional arbitration in general. These problems highlight the need for discov-
ery in international arbitration. For example, Mr. Jean Robert, President of
136. For a full discussion on enforcement, see infra notes 151-201 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602
F.2d 1062, 1063 (2d Cir. 1979).
138. See Futura Trading Inc. v. Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, Award No. 187-325-
3 (August 19, 1985).
139. See infra notes 151-201 and accompanying text.
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the ICC, in comparing international and domestic arbitration, emphasizes
the importance documentary evidence may play in international arbitration:
In view 6f the geographical distance which may separate the parties in interna-
tional commercial arbitration, documentary evidence may play a far more impor-
tant role than in domestic arbitration. It may be difficult to bring witnesses and
parties together at one place for a hearing. Written statements, produced by the
parties and documentary evidence may therefore first be considered. In some
cases it may even be possible to decide the case on the sole basis of an exchange of
written statements and documentary evidence.
140
Because of the important role documents can play in international arbitra-
tion, Mr. Robert concludes that international arbitrators should have the
power to enforce discovery.
Ideological differences as well as geographical distances hinder parties in
procuring evidence as illustrated at the Tribunal. Given the political tension
that may exist in international arbitrations, it is highly unlikely that parties
will volunteer information, as may be possible in a labor arbitration for
example. 41 Furthermore, in some types of international as opposed to
domestic arbitration, it is less probable that the parties either had or want to
continue an ongoing relationship, 42 especially parties before a claims tri-
bunal where political entities present cases.
International arbitrations with a government as a party are not uncom-
mon. Witnesses with firsthand knowledge of the parties' dealings, however,
are seldom found in government ministries because of the high turnover in
government employment and because of the large volume of work that each
employee may handle on a daily basis. For this reason, discovery of docu-
ments when a government or government agency is involved may be very
helpful. 143 Routine procedures and printed forms are important in govern-
ment agencies also and may prove invaluable when questioning a govern-
ment official who does not have primary knowledge of a case. 14 4
Perhaps the biggest difference between international and domestic arbi-
tral discovery is the lack of enforcement power in the international area,
which is demonstrated at the Tribunal. Even though they are not always
utilized, the availability of court orders to subpoena witnesses and docu-
ments makes enforcement in domestic arbitration such as labor arbitrations
much simpler. The possibility that such procedures will be employed may be
enough of an incentive to comply. A few other nations also provide for the
140. Robert, supra note 4, at 223.
141. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 51 and 98 and accompanying text.
143. See Audiotape, supra note 4, at 163.
144. See id. at 164.
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use of court orders to enforce discovery. 14 5 The absence of the enforcement
authority in international arbitration, 46 reduces the efficacy of arbitral
discovery.
In addition to being suspicious of discovery, parties unfamiliar with
Anglo-American legal procedures may not understand the operation of
these procedures, 147 thus making their use less effective. In one reply to a
request for documents, for example, the Iranian respondent stated that the
burden of proof was on the claimant and therefore, it was not proper for
them to submit the requested documents. In contrast, parties in domestic
arbitration presumably have an understanding of discovery thereby facilitat-
ing its use.
Perhaps, too, certain Anglo-American discovery procedures are in-
appropriate for use at the Tribunal, and thus, other types of limited discov-
ery mechanisms could be more usefully employed. The UNCITRAL Rules
have attempted to deal with the problem of discovery, 148 but more detailed
rules might more clearly guide all parties in effectively employing vital
information-gathering procedures.
There are some common characteristics which make discovery efficacious
in both the international and domestic arbitral settings. As stated earlier,
discovery is most useful in complex or costly cases. Because both interna-
tional and domestic commercial cases are often complex149 and costly, the
use of discovery is beneficial in both. 150 In any sort of arbitration, it is likely
that the adversary will have significant evidence in his sole possession, but
the problem is exacerbated in transnational disputes.
15 1
145. The English Arbitration Act gives the High Court the power to order discovery of
documents, interrogatories, depositions and inspections. Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch.
27, § 12(6).
Under French law a party may apply to a French court during an arbitration to subpoena
witnesses or documents. Nouveau Code de Civile Procedure (Nov. C. PR. Civ.) art 11(1)
(Dalloz ed. 1979). See also Delaume, International Arbitration under French Law: The Decree
of May 12, 1981, 37 ARB. J. 38, 43 (1982).
In Belgium also, the Court of the First Instance is authorized to compel witnesses and the
production of documents. Code Judicare, 14.7.72, art. 16; see also INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, ARBITRATION LAW IN EUROPE, 37 (1981).
146. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
147. See MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 61, at 285.
Even a party who is determined to perform his obligations conscientiously by making a full
disclosure of his documents may well be at a loss to know how far his obligations extend.
Discovery is one of the most difficult aspects of English procedure, and although even an
English lawyer may from time to time be daunted by the problem, at least his experience will
give him a better chance than a layman of arriving at the correct solutions.
Id.; cf. FELLER, supra note 133, at 251.
148. See supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
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In general, if reasonably limited, discovery can be desirable in both
domestic and international arbitration. Typically, though, the international
disputant will face many more obstacles in obtaining eivdence from his
foreign adversary. Accordingly, the need for improvement in discovery
procedures in multinational arbitration, especially the production of docu-
ments, is much greater than that in domestic arbitration.
B. GENERAL ENFORCEMENT SUGGESTIONS
If discovery is in fact useful in some arbitral situations, then some provi-
sion should be made to ensure adherence to discovery orders. The proposals
suggested here are primarily aimed at the international problem, particu-
larly before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, but can also be applied
to other kinds of arbitration, such as labor, where enforcement may pose
difficulties.
First, before enforcement of a discovery order can be effected, the right to
such a procedure must be proven. The general right of discovery in interna-
tional arbitration has already been established. International law scholars,
arbitrators, and the arbitration rules themselves have upheld the right of
discovery, especially document production, in international arbitration. 
152
Even parties refusing to produce documents have admitted the obligation to
produce relevant evidence.' 53 Moreover, authority to order discovery may
be found in the arbitration clause of a contract drawn up between two or
more of the adversary parties.
As stated earlier, parties can avoid expensive, time-consuming disputes
over discovery by agreeing beforehand to the scope of discovery pro-
cedures. 154 Sanctions for failure to comply can also be included in both
domestic and international contracts including collective bargaining agree-
ments. If one of the parties refuses to comply or employs dilatory tactics with
regard to discovery orders, his opponent may be able to bring an anticipa-
tory repudiation or frustration of contract claim against the recalcitrant
party. 155 An abandonment of the agreement to refer the case to arbitration
may be a valid claim in the more egregious cases. 156 By agreeing to discovery
in the original contract, the parties may avert compliance problems
152. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
155. See Thomas, The Legal Remedies for Dilatoriness in the Prehearing Arbitral Procedure,
2 LLOYD'S MAR. & CoM. L.Q. 315 (1983).
156. Id. at 328. Several British cases in which there was undue delay in prearbitral proce-
dures have been decided on the repudiation, frustration or abandonment grounds. See gener-
ally id. for a full discussion.
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altogether, but in the case where such problems do arise, the injured party is
armed with strong legal arguments to protect himself.
Besides causing delay and increasing expense, the failure to comply with
discovery orders may foster disrespect for the entire arbitral process. Parties
who have cooperated in the arbitral proceeding will feel they have been
treated unfairly: "[T]he making of an order for discovery takes it for granted
that both sides will thoroughly comply with the order ... if ... one party
gives full discovery while the other does not, the former may be placed at a
serious disadvantage.' 157 For example, one American claimant's disgust
with the respondent's disrespect for a Tribunal discovery order exhibits his
frustration with the entire process:
While [company name] is perfectly aware of the practical limitations with which
the Tribunal is faced in attempting to deal with outrageous and irresponsible
behavior on the part of the [r]espondents in this and other matters, we do feel that
[rJespondents must be made aware once and for all that they are not exempt from
the rules and procedures by which all participants . before the Tribunal are
required to abide.
In addition to the deleterious effects on the individual seeking discovery,
noncompliance hurts all parties before an international claims commission
both by encouraging further noncompliance in subsequent claims and by
causing undue delay in the hearing of other claims (especially at the Tribunal
where thousands of claims have yet to be adjudicated). 58 Where the parties
have an ongoing relationship, such as in labor or domestic commercial
arbitration, noncompliance can be especially damaging to the relationship
as well as to the conduct of future arbitrations between the parties.
59
Noncompliance may also cause a party to a domestic or international
arbitration to question the finality of an award in court, thereby undermin-
ing the effectiveness of arbitration. Courts may refuse enforcement of
arbitration awards in labor cases under certain circumstances.1 60 In one
case, for example, an award was reversed by a New Jersey state court
because the employer had presented his production of documents as com-
plete but in reality had offered incomplete documents.161 Even if a party
157. MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 61, at 285.
158. Cf. K. CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 23 (1946).
159. See supra notes 48-53 and 98 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
Holodnak v. Avco Corp. and UAW Local 1010, 514 F.2d 285 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 188 (1975); Torrington Co. v. Metal Products Workers Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2nd
Cir. 1966).
161. See Teamsters v. ABAD, 135 N.J. Super. 552,90 L.R.R.M. 2191 (1975). The decision,
however, was remanded by the appellate court because there was nothing in the record to show
that the employer intentionally withheld documents. Teamsters v. ABAD, 93 L.R.R.M. 2791
(1976). See also Harvey Aluminum v. United Steelworkers of America, 263 F.Supp. 488 (D.C.
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does not appeal to a court or has no authority to do so, there is also the
chance that arbitrators may feel compelled to reopen a case if new evidence
comes to light. 162 One case before the United States-German Mixed Claims
Commission was reopened because new evidence had come to light. 163
While the UNCITRAL Rules provide that all awards are "final and
binding,"' 164 provision is made for correction of an award for "errors in
computation, any clerical or typographical errors, or any errors of a similar
nature.' ' 165 Also, the parties can request the Tribunal to issue an additional
award "as to claims presented in the arbitral proceeding but omitted from
the award.', 166 While it is unlikely that these rules are broad enough to allow
the reopening of case for new evidence, the possibility of skillful argument
on this issue may still remain. If the parties are able to use these rules to
upset the finality of an award, the results will be undesirable, especially




One obviously undesirable enforcement sanction which could be em-
ployed is "self-help." Thus, if joint requests are made for documents, one
party can withhold requested evidence until his opponent complies. Such
measures not only undermine the authority of the arbitrators but also end up
in "cat and mouse games" in which both parties wait for the other party to
comply first. Where a large number of cases are being adjudicated before a
claims tribunal, a number of claimants could try to "gang up" on a single
opponent (such as Iran) in an attempt to gain enforcement. Even if such a
scheme could be organized properly, the results would be both unsatisfac-
tory and devastating to the whole claims procedure. In domestic commercial
or labor arbitration where the parties hope to have a continuing rela-
tionship, the refusal of one party to comply in response to his opponent's
prior refusal, would be severely detrimental. 167 Hence, self-help tactics are
useless.
Cal. 1967) (court overturned arbitration award where arbitrator did not allow parties to offer all
material evidence).
162. Cf. FELLER, supra note 133, at 257; CARLSTON, supra note 158, at 26 (citing to Rio
Grande Irrigation and Land Co., Ltd. v. United States, American and British Claims Arbitra-
tion, REPORT OF FRED K. NIELSEN 334 (1926)).
163. See id. (citing to Lehigh Valley RR Co. et al. v. Germany (1930)).
164. UNCITRAL Rules, art. 32(2).
165.Id. at art. 36(1).
166. Id. at art. 37(1).
167. See supra notes 48-53 and 98 and accompanying text.
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2. Negative Inferences
Probably the most powerful and most easily facilitated enforcement
weapon in both domestic and international settings is the arbitrator's
assumption of negative inference from the refusal to produce requested
evidence. It has been used by many arbitrators. 168 Its use has been strongly
advocated in labor arbitration.1 69 The Tribunal, in two cases, has drawn a
negative inference from the respondent's failure to produce documents
available to it. 170 In one case, Chamber One found the respondent's excuse
for non-production-the documents were "voluminous"-unconvincing.
The American arbitrators before the Tribunal have advocated the use of the
negative inference in a number of their opinions. 17 1 To buttress their
assumptions, these arbitrators have cited both international legal authority
and Iranian law. 172 France has codified the arbitrator's right to take a lack of
cooperation into account when issuing an award. 173 Hence, the arbitrator's
authorization to make such an inference is fairly well-established in both
international and domestic law. In general, the law of estoppel will also
operate against a party who deliberately withholds evidence.1 74
A corollary of this inference, i.e., to infer facts to exist from circumstantial
or sketchy evidence, has also been asserted by international authorities. 7 5
The International Court stated: "By reason of this exclusive control, the
other State, the victim of a breach of international law, is often unable to
furnish direct proof. . . .Such a State would be allowed a more liberal
recourse to inference of fact and circumstantial evidence. This indirect
168. See, e.g., supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
169. Id.; see also R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS, 175 (1967).
170. See INA Corporation v. Iran, Award No. 184-161-1 (Aug. 13, 1985); Isaiah v. Bank
Mellat, Award No. 35-219-2 (March 30, 1983), 2 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 232 (1984).
171. See, e.g., INA Corp., Award No. 184-161-1, at 14; Ultrasystems Inc., 2 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. at 115, 120-21 (Mosk, J., concurring); Raygo Wagner Equipment Co. v. Iran Express
Terminal, Award No. 30-16-3 (March 18, 1983) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting), 2
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 146, 152-53 (1984); ITT Industries v. Iran, Award No. 47-156-2 (May 26,
1983) (Aldrich, J., concurring), 2 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 349, 355 (1984).
172. Mosk has cited D. Sandifer's EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS a number of
times. See, e.g., Ultrasystems, 2 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. at 115, 121. He has also cited Articles
300-302, of the CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE OF IRAN (Sabi trans. 1972) as authority for this
proposition. See id., Raygo, 2 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. at 152,153. Holtzman has cited Witenberg, La
Theorie des Preuves Devant Les Jurisdictions Internationales, 56 RECUEIL DES CoURs 5, 47-8(11-1936). See J. I. Case Co. v. Iran, Award No. 57-244-1 (June 15, 1983). Aldrich has cited the
Separate Opinion of Judge Jessup in the Barcelona Traction Case, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 216. See ITT,
2 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. at 355.
173. See Nouveau Code de Civile Procedure (Nov. C. PR. CIv.) art. 11(1); see also J. ROBERT
& T. CARBONNEAU, I THE FRENCH LAW OF ARBITRATION, § 3-12 (1983).
174. See J. SIMPSON & H. Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION-LAW AND PRACTICE, 226 (1959),
citing to Bowerman & Burberry's Ltd. v. United Mexican States, Decision No. 18, V.U.N.
Rep. 104.
175. See, e.g., Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 18; SANDIFER, supra note 12, at 22.
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evidence is admitted in all systems of law, and its use is recognized by
international decisions."' 176 The use of both these positive and negative
inferences can serve to counterbalance the effects of noncompliance in all
types of arbitration.
The primary advantage of these evidentiary assumptions is their ease of
administration no matter what statute or agreement the arbitrator is acting
under-the arbitrator can act without the aid of outside courts and without
the action of either party. 177 The mere possibility that such an inference will
be drawn will discourage parties from hiding relevant materials because they
will face the possibility of losing an entire case; whereas, with other types of
sanctions, they may stand to lose something less than the entire case. An
imposition of a fine, for instance, will only cause the refusing party to lose a
certain amount of money. The disadvantages of using these inferences will
be discussed below. 178
3. The Burden of Proof
In the same vein as the evidentiary inference, the arbitrator may also
place the burden of proof on the party who has access to the evidence. The
procedure seems especially fair when one party refuses to disclose the
evidence to which it has access. The Tribunal has used the burden of proof
approach in Dallal v. Iran,1 79 a case in which there was no discovery request.
The Tribunal denied the claimant's assertion that his reticence was due to
concern for the safety of relatives and business connections in Iran because
the Tribunal believed that the claimant could have produced the needed
evidence without revealing the identity of relatives and business con-
nections. 180
The advantages of this approach are similar to that of the evidentiary
assumption-it can be effected without procedural hassles. The drawback of
these evidentiary sanctions is the possibility that the party against whom the
sanction is imposed truly does not have access to the necessary evidence
(conceivably because it was destroyed sometime in the past). In an effort to
demonstrate its inability to comply with a discovery order, an Iranian
ministry reasoned: "When an action is beyond the ability of a person, can it
be done and carried out? Of course not." This excerpt exhibits the dilemma
facing any arbitrator in trying to enforce discovery orders-he can either
176. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J., at 18.
177. Cf. W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, 84-1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
77 (1984).
178. See infra notes 180-186 and accompanying text.
179. Award No. 53-149-1 (June 10, 1983), Iranian Assets Litigation Rep. 6,819 (July 7,
1983).
180. Id. at 6,827.
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accept the word of the refusing party or he can presume a negative inference
from the refusal (or put the burden of proof on the refusing party), although
the refusal may be legitimate.
If the evidentiary sanctions are indeed imposed on an innocent party, that
party may protest the enforceability of the arbitrators' award. 181 Imposition
of such sanctions may also cause dissension among the members of an
arbitral panel.182 As shown above, such a protest or appeal to a court will
frustrate some of the goals of arbitration. 183
4. Other Arbitral Sanctions
In regard to compliance problems at the Tribunal, some legal scholars and
practitioners have suggested sanctions similar to those imposed under U.S.
Rules of Civil Procedure. 184 These sanctions could be used more effectively
in domestic arbitration when there is a chance that both parties and the
arbitrators have an understanding of how the sanctions work. The sugges-
tions include: taking cases off the active list where the claimant is the
refusing party; striking any claim relying in any significant amount on a
document not furnished; imposing contempt fines on the refusing party; and
issuing a default judgment. 185 The harshness of the sanction imposed would
vary with the severity of the offense.1
86
At present, arbitrators will rarely have the authority to impose these
sanctions. Indeed, Chamber One has held that claimant's requested sanc-
tions such as taking the claimant's facts as established, refusing to allow
respondents to oppose claimant's statement or introduce evidence, striking
the counter-claim or entering a default judgment, were not provided for
under the Tribunal rules although respondent had failed to comply with the
Tribunal's interim award. As stated earlier, parties to a contract or collec-
tive bargaining agreement can provide for similar sanctions in the
181. There have been cases in which a party has sought an addition to or correction of an
award under Tribunal Rules 36 and 37. See, e.g., Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Iran,
Decision (Jan. 5, 1984) on Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Iran, Award No. 73-67-3 (Sept. 2,
1983).
182. For other reasons, certain arbitrators have refused to sign awards at the Tribunal. See,
e.g., Rexnord Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 21-132-3 (January 10, 1983), 2 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 6, 14
(1984) (Sani Refusal); Ataollah Golpira v. Iran, Award No. 32-211-2 (March 29, 1983), 2
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 171, 177 (1984) (Shafeiei Refusal).
183. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
184. See Lowenfeld, The U.S.-Iranian Dispute Settlement Accords: An Arbitrator Looks at
the Prospects for Arbitration, 36 ARB. J. 6 (1981); Audiotape, supra note 4, at 172.
185. See Audiotape, supra note 4, at 172. For a full discussion of these and other sanctions
available in the U.S. courts, see generally Renfrew, supra note 1, at 6.
186. See Audiotape, supra note 4, at 173; Note, The Use of Rule 37(b) Sanctions to Enforce
Jurisdictional Discovery, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 842-46 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Rule 37(b)
Sanctions].
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agreement. 187 Either or both parties may be unwilling to consent to giving
the arbitrators these powers. Again, the enforceability of the award may be
questioned if such sanctions are employed.
In considering the advisability of granting the right to impose such sanc-
tions, it is helpful to examine briefly the effectiveness of each in light of their
use in the U.S. courts. The issue-preclusive sanction is advantageous be-
cause it can be tailored to correct the particular harm suffered due to the
opponent's disobedience. 188 It also "eliminates the benefit that the defen-
dant may have gained through delaying discovery and thus causing the
plaintiff to be inadequately prepared at trial.'
189
A default judgment may often be too harsh a sanction, even in American
courts. 190 Because it dismisses an entire case on the basis of noncompliance
on perhaps one issue, it may contravene the aim of reaching a fair and
reasoned decision. 191 Such a severe sanction should be used only when other
sanctions have failed. 
192
The imposition of a lump-sum fine may not induce compliance if the party
weighs his options and decides that he would be better off paying the fine
rather than complying. 193 Thus, for a fine to be effective, it should accrue
until the obligation to disclose information is fulfilled. 194 French law, for
instance, provides for the imposition of a daily fine (an astriente) for a failure
to comply with a discovery order. 195 The use of such fines could easily be
facilitated in domestic arbitration in which both parties may exist in close
proximity. At the Tribunal, it might be possible to pay fines from the
Security Account previously mentioned. In fact, Chamber Three stated it
would consider the imposition of a monetary sanction on the respondents if
they failed to comply with the Tribunal's orders. Moreover, the arbitrator
will also have to supervise the payment of such fines.
196
5. Court-imposed Sanctions
If the arbitrator is unauthorized to impose sanctions similar to those under
U.S. Federal Rules, parties may be able to apply to local courts to impose
such sanctions. The French sanction of astreintes, for example, must be
187. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text; see also supra note 73 and accompanying
text.
188. See Rule 37(b) Sanctions, supra note 186, at 845.
189. Id. at 846.
190. See id. at 843.
191. See id. at 845.
192. Cf. id.
193. See id. at 843.
194. See id. at 842.
195. Nov. C. PR. Civ., art. 11(2).
196. See Note, supra note 186, at 842.
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authorized by a court. 197 Because these procedures are already provided for
in both U.S. federal and state statutes and court decisions,198 court imposed
sanctions probably are best suited for arbitration in the United States. The
parties' familiarity with the courts and procedures will reduce the time and
money spent in procuring such sanctions. As discussed previously, however,
some U.S. courts have been hesitant in allowing arbitral discovery.' 99 No
doubt these courts will balk at imposing discovery sanctions also. If court
imposed sanctions are to be effective, the courts must be more willing to
take an active role.
At least one commentator believes that, although the UNCITRAL Rules
contain no express provision concerning subpoenas, the parties are not
precluded from requesting help from the local courts.20 0 Such subpoenas
could be used as a means of enforcing discovery orders. Other international
bodies have also been given the power to invoke the aid of the municipal
courts of the states by which they were established.20'
Besides its questionable authorization unless it is expressly granted,
court-aided enforcement can be a cumbersome, lengthy procedure, as ex-
emplified in the labor field where a party may have to go through both the
NLRB and the courts. 20 2 Court-aided enforcement will be even more dif-
ficult in international arbitration. For example, if it were to be used before
the Tribunal, the question would arise as to which courts-American,
Iranian or Dutch-should have the power. It is unlikely that the American
or Iranian courts would have much more success than the Tribunal in
gaining compliance. Finally, the advantages of arbitration are lost if court
involvement becomes necessary.
VI. Conclusion
From its beginning in Roman law until the present, discovery has been
perceived as a useful device in litigation, although the possibility for its
abuse is always present. If confined to certain parameters, discovery, parti-
cularly the production of documents, can be efficacious in various arbitral
settings. Discovery is especially essential to parties before the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal because the marshalling of evidence is so difficult. Discov-
ery before the Tribunal, however, has proved to be time-consuming and
197. See ROBERT & CARBONNEAU, supra note 173, at § 3-12.
198. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text. The British courts have been more
willing in this regard. See Stein & Wotman, supra note 131, at 1706-07.
200. See Stein & Wotman, supra note 131, at 1707.
201. For example, Article 52 of the Franco-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal Rules of
Procedure provided for court assistance. See SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 174, at 203.
202. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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virtually unenforceable. Unless the compliance problem in all arbitrations
can be dealt with effectively, the process is futile, serving only to frustrate
the arbitrating parties and undermine the authority of the arbitrator in
hearing all cases. The most effective and widely-used sanction for noncom-
pliance in all arbitral settings would seem to be the arbitrator's ability to
adopt a negative inference from a party's failure to produce accessible
evidence. Yet, even this sanction has its pitfalls, in that it may cause a party
to question the enforceability of a final award. At the Tribunal, at least, this
risk is small because of the existence of the Security Account from which
awards are paid. In other areas, the ability to question the finality of an
award may lead to lengthy court battles, the precise result the parties sought
to avoid by employing arbitration.
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